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Abstract 
The Internet has dramatically reduced search costs for customers through tools such as 
shopbots. The conventional wisdom is that this reduction in search costs will increase price 
competition leading to a decline in prices and profits for online firms. In this paper, we provide an 
argument for why in contrast to conventional wisdom, competition may be reduced and prices may 
rise as consumer search costs for prices fall. Our argument has particular appeal in the context of the 
Internet, where email targeting and the ability to track and record customer behavior are institutional 
features that facilitate cost effective targeted pricing by firms. We show that such targeted pricing 
can serve as an effective counterweight to keep average prices high despite the downward pressure 
on prices due to low search costs. Surprisingly, we find that the effectiveness of targeting itself 
improves as search costs fall; therefore prices and profits can increase as search costs fall. 
The intuition for our argument is as follows: Consider a market where consumers are 
heterogeneous in their loyalty as well as their cost per unit time to search. In the brick and mortar 
world, it takes consumers a very large amount of time to search across multiple firms. Therefore few 
customers will search in equilibrium because the gains from search will be relatively small compared 
to the cost of search. In such a market, a firm will not be able to distinguish whether its customers 
bought from it due to their high loyalty or due to their unwillingness to search for low prices because 
of the high search cost.  
On the Internet, the amount of time to search across multiple stores is minimal (say zero). 
Now irrespective of their opportunity cost of time, all consumers can search because the time to 
search is negligible. If in spite of this, a consumer does not search in this environment, she is 
revealing that her loyalty to the firm that she buys from is very high. The key insight is that as search 
becomes easy for everyone, then lack of search indicates strong customer loyalty and thus can be 
used as a proxy to segment the market into loyal and price sensitive segments.  
Thanks to email technology, firms can selectively set differential prices to different 
customers, i.e. a high price to the loyal segment and a low price to the price sensitive segment, at 
relatively low cost. The increased competition due to price transparency caused by low search costs 
can thus be offset by the ability of firms to price discriminate between their loyal (price insensitive) 
customers and their price sensitive customers. In fact, we find that it can reduce the extent of 
competition among the firms and raise their profits. Most surprisingly, the positive effect of targeting 
on prices improves when search costs fall, because firms can learn more about the differences in 
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pricing however is moderated by the extent of opt-in by customers who give their permission for 
firms to contact them directly by email. 
Our analysis offers interesting strategic insights for managers about how to address the 
competitive problems associated with low search costs on the Internet:  
(1)  It suggests that firms should invest in better technologies for personalization and targeted 
pricing so as to prevent the Internet from becoming a competitive minefield that destroys firm 
profitability. In fact we show that low search costs can facilitate better price personalization 
and can thus aid in improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing efforts. 
(2)  The analysis also offers guidelines for online customer acquisition efforts. The critical issue for 
competitive advantage is not in increasing market share per se, but in increasing the loyalty of 
customers. While a larger share of very loyal customers reduces competitive intensity, 
surprisingly a larger share of customers who are not very loyal can be a competitive 
disadvantage. In order for customer acquisition to be profitable, it should be accompanied by a 
superior product or service that can ensure high loyalty. 
(3)  Investing in online privacy initiatives that assures consumers that their private information will 
not be abused other than to offer them “deals” is worthwhile. Such assurances will encourage 
consumers to opt into firm mailing lists. This facilitates successful targeting which in turn 
ameliorates the competitive threats due to low search costs on the Internet.  
(4)  When the overwhelming majority of customers are satisfied with online privacy, the remaining 
privacy conscious customers who are not willing to pay a higher price to maintain their privacy 
will be left out of the market. While this may be of some concern to privacy advocates, it is 
interesting that total consumer welfare can be higher even if some consumers are left out of the 
market. 
Our analysis captures the competitive implications of the interaction between two institutions 
facilitated by the Internet: Shopbots and Emails. But the research question addressed is more 
fundamental: What is the nature of competition in an environment with low costs for both consumer 
search and firm-to-consumer personalized communications? The strategic insights obtained in the 
paper may be beneficially applied even to offline businesses that can replicate such an environment. 
For example, offline firms could have websites on which they post prices allowing for easy price 
comparisons. They could also use tools such as frequency programs to create addressable databases 
that enable them to communicate with customers by direct mail and email (as many airlines and 
stores do). 
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There is a standard argument in the theoretical literature on price search that as consumer 
search costs fall, competition will intensify in response to the greater transparency in prices. This 
argument implies that on the Internet, which is characterized by extremely low search costs 
(where customers can find out prices across a large number of online stores through technologies 
such as shopbots), price competition will be very intense and profitability will be low. 
Theoretical papers such as Bakos (1997), Zettelmeyer (1998) and conceptual discussions as in 
Alba et al (1997), Shapiro and Varian (1999) have come to a similar conclusion. Such arguments 
have also had tremendous impact among business professionals and the popular press. 
For example, in his 1995 bestseller 'The Road Ahead', Bill Gates suggests that the 
Internet "will carry us into a new world of low-friction, low-overhead capitalism, in which 
market information will be plentiful and transaction costs low. It will be a shopper's heaven."  A 
Business Week article tellingly titled, " A Market Too Perfect for Profits", (Kuttner, 05/11/98) 
says "The Internet is a nearly perfect market because information is instantaneous and buyers can 
compare the offerings of sellers worldwide. The result is fierce price competition, dwindling 
product differentiation, and vanishing brand loyalty."   
The logical question that follows from this line of argument however is the question 
asked in a Los Angeles Times article, "If the Internet offers the "lowest prices on Earth" just a 
mouse click away, … then who can make any money?" (Gaw, 12/14/98) Yes, if all that the 
Internet serves is to intensify price competition, why would any firm invest on the Internet?  We 
do see some well-publicized failures of some big name e-tailers such as EToys and Pets.com.  
But is such fate inevitable for the surviving e-tailers too?  
In this paper, we provide an argument for why in contrast to conventional wisdom, 
competition may be reduced and prices may rise as consumer search costs for prices fall. Our 
argument has particular appeal in the context of the Internet, where shopbots, email targeting and 
the ability to record and track customer behavior are institutional features that facilitate the 
applicability of our argument. We show that our argument may help to resolve the apparently 
divergent findings in empirical research on the average levels of prices on the Internet.  
The basic intuition for our argument is as follows: Consider a market where consumers 
are heterogeneous in their loyalty/preference as well as their costs per unit time to search. 
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amount of time to compare prices across multiple firms. In such an environment, very few 
customers will search prices of different firms because the gains from search will be relatively 
small compared to the cost of doing it. A firm in such a market will not be able to distinguish 
customers who bought from it due to their high loyalty from those who bought from it due to 
their unwillingness to search for low prices because of the high search costs.  
Now suppose in another environment (as in the online world), the amount of time to 
search across multiple firms is minimal (say zero). Now irrespective of their opportunity cost of 
time, all consumers can search because the time to search is negligible. If in spite of this a 
consumer does not search in this environment, she is revealing that her loyalty to the firm that 
she buys from is very high. This enables the firm to segment the market in terms of customer 
loyalty. If firms can then set differential prices, i.e. a high price to the loyal (price insensitive) 
segment and a low price to the price sensitive segment, the increased competition due to price 
transparency caused by low search costs can be offset by the increased ability for firms to price 
discriminate.  In fact, under certain circumstances, the competition among firms can be reduced 
to the extent that their profits can actually rise with a decline in consumer search costs for price 
information. 
The central idea of the above argument is that as search becomes easy for everyone, then 
lack of search indicates consumer loyalty and thus can be used as a proxy to segment the market. 
However, if search is hard, then lack of search can either indicate that consumers have high value 
for time or that they are highly loyal to firms.  Consequently, firms are unable to segment the 
market in such an environment leading to greater competition and lower profits. 
Critical to the applicability of our argument is that firms should be able to track the 
individual customer’s behavior over time so that they can classify the customer into a loyal or 
price sensitive customer. On the Internet, it is relatively easy to record a customer’s shopping 
behavior and categorize the customer into segments. Furthermore, in order to profit from the 
segmentation information revealed by consumer price search, firms should be able to selectively 
offer lower prices to the price sensitive consumers relative to the loyal consumers. On the 
Internet, such a price discrimination strategy can be implemented by selectively delivering email 
coupons to price sensitive customers (because firms have access to email addresses of 
consumers), while the loyal customers pay the higher prices posted on firms’ websites. For 
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histories of customers to pepper them with offers (Stellin, 08/21/2000). Email targeting is 
effective because emails can be delivered instantaneously and the responses are also relatively 
fast comparing to the promotional offerings in the offline world. According to the New York 
Times, “Email is a relatively inexpensive marketing tool, ranging from a penny to a quarter for 
each message, compared to $1-$2 for each piece of direct mail campaigns in the actual world. 
Moreover, email campaigns produce immediate results, no small factor in an industry, where 
speed is critical.” (Stellin, 08/21/2000). Email marketing has been progressively increasing with 
Forrester Research and eMarketer forecasting its growth in excess of 100% annually.
1 With 
email targeting, firms are able to effectively utilize information about consumer loyalty (gleaned 
by observing consumer purchase activities) to segment the market and set targeted prices. As 
search costs drop and more consumers search online, firms can learn more about its customers. 
This can improve the effectiveness of targeted pricing and can help raise firms’ prices and 
profits. Surprisingly, it is even possible for firms’ prices and profits to be higher when consumer 
search cost is zero than when it is infinite. 
As firms’ ability to gather consumer information and send targeting emails increases on 
the Internet, so does consumers’ concern for their privacy. Both consumers and firms are now 
increasingly taking online privacy seriously. Typically, customers can choose to “opt-out” 
(where customers by default receive emails, but can choose not to participate) or “opt-in” (where 
customers will not be included by default in mailings, but will need to explicitly sign in) for 
mailings from firms (Petersen, 02/12/2001). Such policies are a means of obtaining permission 
from customers to send them email offers and are also referred to as “permission marketing” 
(Godin and Peppers, 1999). Permission marketing of course limits the ability of firms to 
operationalize the segmentation of the market. From our modeling viewpoint, we do not 
distinguish between opt-in and opt-out policies and will use the term "opt-in". Our model 
indicates that “opt-in” is a critical variable. It reflects the permission or trust a firm gets from the 
consumers to communicate with them directly.  At low levels of “opt-in”, only posted prices are 
effective and competition online is similar to the offline market where lower search costs 
                                                 
1 The Forrester forecast is discussed in Stellin (08/21/2000) and the eMarketer forecast is provided in the eMail 
Marketing Report  by the firm eMarketer. 
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effectively and their profitability increases as consumer search costs fall. In fact, beyond a 
critical level of “opt-in,” the posted price will become so high that only the loyal segments in the 
market will buy the product at the posted prices and the price-sensitive but privacy conscious 
customers who opt out will find it not worthwhile to buy the product at posted prices. Thus as 
opt-in increases to a critical level with consumers gaining confidence in the technologies that 
help guard privacy, the remaining privacy conscious customers who do not opt-in will be left out 
of the market. 
In recent empirical research there appears to be some divergence in the findings of 
average levels of posted prices at Internet stores. While Bailey (1998) found that average levels 
of prices for books and CDs were higher online than offline between 1996-1997, Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2000) found that the average levels of prices for books and CDs were lower online 
than offline in 1999. Clay et al. (2001) however find that the average prices for books have been 
increasing online between mid 1999 to January 2000. If all of these results were indeed 
consistent, then online posted prices should have followed a U-shaped pattern with prices falling 
between 1997 and 1999 and then rising towards 2000. If we recognize that the costs of consumer 
search have continued to fall and email targeting activities have continued to increase over this 
period, the predictions from our model would be consistent with such a U-shaped pattern on 
posted prices.  
The findings in this paper should be contrasted with two closely related streams of 
research in the literature: In the first stream of literature linked to search costs, Bakos (1997) 
showed in an influential paper that the low search costs make electronic marketplaces vulnerable 
to intense competition. Zettelmeyer (1998) argued that firms can strategically manipulate the 
level of search costs and thus the intensity of competition by making it harder for consumers to 
judge the quality of products. Lal and Sarvary (1999) classify goods as those with primarily 
digital attributes and non-digital attributes
2 and show that the Internet can reduce the intensity of 
competition for goods with non-digital attributes when search costs fall. Unlike Zettelmeyer 
(1998) and Lal and Sarvary (1999), we do not appeal to quality uncertainty arguments when 
                                                 
2 A digital attribute is one that can be communicated easily over the web. Non-digital attributes are things such as 
texture of clothes etc. which cannot be communicated over the web. 
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applicable to product categories such as books and CDs, for which quality uncertainty and non-
digital attributes are not critical. 
This paper is also closely tied to the literature on targeting. Thisse and Vives (1988) and 
Shaffer and Zhang (1995) show that competition will become more intense as firms can target 
consumers. They assume that firms have perfect information on the consumers being targeted. 
However, Chen et al (2001) show that market competition can be softened by firms’ targeting 
activities when their information on consumers is not precise.  In contrast to Chen et al. (2001), 
we are able to show that competitive intensity can be reduced in a low search cost environment 
even if firms can target consumers with perfect information. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §2, we introduce the basic model and in 
§3, we analyze the basic model and discuss the main results of the paper. In §4, we discuss 
several extensions and also relax some of the technical assumptions of the basic model to check 
the robustness of the results. §5 concludes. 
2.  Model 
Consider two competing firms in a product category selling through the Internet.  The 
marginal production cost of each firm is assumed to be zero without loss of any generality.  Each 
firm i has two loyal segments of customers: a "strong loyal segment", si, and a "weak loyal 
segment", wi.  Consumers in the strong loyal segment, si, have a reservation price rs for firm i’s 
product and they will never switch to buy from firm j (j=3-i).  However, consumers in the weak 
loyal segment, wi, have a reservation price rw for firm i’s product and a reservation price rw-L for 
firm j’s product. Therefore, firm i’s weak loyal consumers will switch to buy from firm j if the 
price difference between two firms is larger than L, i.e. if pi-pj>L, and pj≤  rw. We assume that 
rw<rs, implying that consumers in the strong loyal segment have higher willingness to pay than 
those in the weak loyal segment.  The strong loyal segments in our model are similar to the loyal 
segments in the model used by Narasimhan (1988) and the weak loyal segments in our model are 
similar to the consumer segments in the model used by Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990). Each 
consumer makes a purchase decision to maximize her consumer surplus and buys at most one 
unit from the product category. If a consumer is indifferent between buying from a firm and 
making no purchase at all, we assume that she will make the purchase. Without loss of any 
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segments (two weak loyal and two strong loyal segments) to be equal to 1.   
When consumers use shopbots (e.g. Mysimon.com), they can find prices across a large 
number of online stores at one shot with a few mouse clicks.  We assume that consumers use 
shopbots to search online and the cost of using shopbots to compare prices of the two firms is ci 
for consumer i.  ci is distributed uniformly between 0 and C in all consumer segments. The 
heterogeneity in consumer search costs can result from the difference in consumers' technical 
savvy with the Internet and shopbots, the speed of their Internet connection and their value of 
time.   
Given the consumer segmentation described earlier, it is obvious that consumers in the 
strong loyal segments have no incentive to search for the price information of the competing 
firms in the market.  Price comparison provided by a shopbot has no value to those consumers 
because their shopping decisions will not be affected by the price comparison.  However, 
consumers in the weak loyal segment have incentives to search for price information, because it 
is optimal for them to switch from the firm they are weakly loyal to if the price at the other firm 
is low enough.   This feature of our model captures a simple but important aspect of consumer 
price search behavior: The search behavior of a consumer is determined not only by her search 
cost but also by her expected gains from search.  Due to the heterogeneity in consumers' à priori 
preferences (loyalty) for the two firms, even consumers with the same search cost may have 
different observed search behavior.  Empirically, Johnson et al. (2001) find that consumer search 
activities for books, CDs and travel sites are quite heterogeneous even though shopbots can be 
used to compare prices at low search costs. 
Denote β  to be the proportion of consumers in either firm's weak loyal segment who use 
shopbots to search firms' prices. These "price searchers" may switch firms if the price difference 
between two firms is larger than L. The remaining consumers who do not search, shop at the 
firm they are loyal to. We should expect that the proportion of consumers that search prices will 
increase when consumer search cost ci decreases and/or the expected gain from price 










.  In the basic model 
here, we treat β  as exogenous.  In §4, we will extend the basic model to formally model 
consumer price search behavior as endogenously determined by search cost and the expected 
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extension. 
While the Internet enables consumers to compare prices across multiple competing firms 
at one shot through shopbots, it also enables firms to contact consumers directly with targeted 
email offerings such as electronic coupons.  Importantly, a firm's targeting ability is highly 
related to the consumer’s level of search.  As consumers search more, firms can also target more 
consumers with more precisely targeted prices.  Consider the following example: Without 
consumer search, a consumer in Firm 2's weak loyal segment, w2, will never search and always 
buy from Firm 2. Consequently, Firm 1 will have no information about consumers in w2 unless it 
buys such information from external data vendors.  However, if β  proportion of w2 consumers 
searches both firms' prices, they may visit and purchase from Firm 1. Consequently, Firm 1 will 
be able to record information about them and potentially target them with emailed coupons.  
Furthermore, because the Internet enables firms to observe competitors' prices easily (with 
technology similar to shopbots, that have been dubbed “pricebots”
3), firms will be able to 
identify the type of consumers in their database if there are price variations in the market and 
consumers stay in the market for a sufficiently long time.  For instance, from Firm 1's 
perspective, consumers who purchased at 1<p1≤ r must be its strong loyal customers; consumers 
who never purchased at p1>1 but purchased at p1≤ 1 and p1-p2>L must be its weak loyal 
customers who do not search; consumers who only purchased at p1 ≤  1 and p1-p2 < -L must be its 
competitor's weak loyal customers who search, and the remaining consumers must be its weak 
loyal customers who search. 
To operationalize the above discussion on the interaction between consumer price search 
behavior and firms' email targeting ability, we assume that each firm has a database with 
individual level information on consumers in 1) its strong loyal segment, si, 2) the proportion of 
its weak loyal segment that do not search, wi(1-β ), 3) the proportion of its weak loyal segment that 
search, wiβ , and 4) the proportion of its competitor's weak loyal segment that search, wjβ .  Firms 
can identify each consumer in its database in terms of her membership in the segments of si,  
                                                 
3 Buy.com boasts that it offers “the lowest prices on earth” by regularly monitoring the competitive prices and 
updating its prices, using such technology.   
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4      
Because of the time constraints in reading emails and the growing concerns about online 
privacy, some consumers may not read or want to be targeted by emails. Typically firms give 
consumers the option to either "opt out" of an email list or "opt in" to an email list.  We do not 
distinguish between opt-in and opt-out policies and will use the term "opt-in" hereafter.     
Actually, we will use the term "opt-in" in an even broader sense in the paper by treating 
consumers who receive targeting emails but do not open or read them as if they have not "opted 
in". 
As long as the cost of checking an email is nonzero, a firm's strong loyal consumers and 
weak loyal consumers who do not search (i.e. consumers in si, and wi(1-β )) have no incentive to 
opt in.  A firm sending email to such a consumer will optimally set the targeting price equal to 
her reservation price because there is no competition from the other firm for the consumer. 
Therefore the consumer will have no gain from reading the email, but incur a non-zero cost to 
check it.  As a result, the expected utility gain from reading a target email is negative for a 
consumer in segments si, and wi(1-β ).  Hence consumers who do not search will have no incentive 
to opt-in and therefore cannot be targeted by firms. This further illustrates the strong correlation 
between consumers' search behavior and firms' targeting ability.     
However, consumers who search for prices have incentive to receive and read emails 
because firms have incentive to compete for them with prices lower than posted prices on their 
websites. We assume that θ  proportion of consumers who search for prices are potentially 
responsive to firms' email targeting, i.e. they have opted in.  The remaining consumers either 
ignore targeting emails or choose to not receive emails because of time constraint or privacy 
concerns. θ  can also be interpreted as a measure of consumer acceptance to targeting emails or 
the effectiveness (responsiveness) of targeting emails.  
The marginal cost of sending a targeting email is assumed to be zero, consistent with the 
relatively low cost of sending an email message relative to direct mail.  Each firm simultaneously 
sets its posted price pi to all consumers and email targeting prices p
x
ie (x=wiβθ  or wjβθ ) to its own 
weak loyal consumers and its competitor's weak loyal consumers who search prices and opt in.   
                                                 
4 Our results will not be changed even if firms cannot distinguish consumers from si, and wi(1-β ).   
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economic effects resulting from the interaction between consumer search behavior and firms’ 
targeting activities. There are only four parameters in the basic model: r reflects the degree of 
consumer heterogeneity; L reflects the intensity of competition in the market; β  reflects the 
magnitude of consumer search; θ  reflects the extent of consumer acceptance to email targeting; 
and consequently βθ  reflects the magnitude of firms' targeting activities. 
Before we proceed to the formal analysis of the model, we make three additional 
technical assumptions. First, we assume that 1<r<2. This assumption guarantees that each firm 







.  This assumption makes it possible for weak loyal consumers to switch in 
equilibrium and ensures tractability for the model.
5  Finally, we assume that consumers incur no 
cost to go to the website of the firm they are loyal to.
6  Thus, a consumer may still visit the 
website of the firm she is loyal to and buy from there even if she expects to be charged at her 
reservation price. Discussions on the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the 
relaxations of these technical assumptions will be provided in §4 where we discuss extensions of 
the basic model. 
3.  Analysis 
We start our analysis by examining firms’ equilibrium decisions regarding email 
targeting.  After receiving targeting emails from both firms, Firm 1's weak loyal consumers who 
search for prices and opt in (i.e. consumers in the w1βθ  segment) compare the two email offerings 




2e ≤  L and p
w1βθ
1e ≤  1.  Therefore, competition for 
this segment results in Firm 1 charging L and Firm 2 charging 0 in equilibrium. Consequently, 
                                                 
5 This assumption on L is similar to that made in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990) (page 291).  
6 For a consumer in the strong loyal segments, her cost of going to the website she is not loyal to is irrelevant to our 
analysis. For a consumer in the weak loyal segment, her cost of going to the website she is not loyal to can be 
regarded as a part of L.  
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equilibrium Firm 1 charges 0 and Firm 2 charges L for Firm 2’s weak loyal consumers who 
search and opt in (the w2βθ  segment).  Firm 1 obtains zero profit and Firm 2 obtains a profit of 
βθ L from this segment.   Overall, each firm obtains a total profit of βθ L from the consumers 
targeted by emails. 
Now consider the market for firms’ posted prices.  Denoting π io and π i as firm i’s profit 
associated with its posted price and its total profit respectively, we have π i =π io+βθ L where  
                                  π io = 0                                       if pi > r,                                          (1) 
                     π io = pi                                       if 1 < pi ≤  r,                                    (2) 
                     π io = pi + pi(1-β )                       if pi > pj+ L and pi ≤  1,                  (3) 
                     π io = pi + pi(1-β ) + piβ (1-θ )     if  pj –L ≤  pi ≤  pj+ L and pi ≤  1,     (4) 
                                 π io = pi + pi(1-β ) + 2piβ (1-θ )   if pi < pj –L and pi ≤  1.                  (5)    
In the above equations, pi is Firm i’s profit from its strong loyal segment when pi ≤  r and 
pi(1-β ) is Firm i’s profit from its weak loyal consumers who do not search when pi≤ 1.When pj –L 
≤  pi ≤  pj + L and pi ≤  1, Firm i gets its weak loyal consumers who neither search nor opt-in for 
email lists. Its profit from those consumers is piβ (1-θ ) as shown in (4). Finally, when pi < pj –L 
and pi≤  1, Firm i gets both its own and the competitor’s weak loyal consumers who do not search 
and do not opt in email lists.  Its profit from them is 2piβ (1-θ ) as shown in (5).  
By the same logic as in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990), firms’ equilibrium posted prices 
may involve mixed strategies. Solving for firms’ optimal decisions based on the profit functions 
given in equations (1)-(5), we can obtain firms’ equilibrium posted prices (or expected posted 
prices, Ei(p), in the case of mixed strategy equilibrium) and total profits as described in Lemma 1 
below.   
 
Lemma 1:  Firms' competition in posted prices results in equilibrium in one of the 
following five exhaustive and mutually exclusive parameter regions.   
                                                 
7 If firms incur positive variable costs and/or fixed costs to send emails, both firms’ equilibrium pricing decisions are 
in mixed strategies. Firm 2 has positive probability of not sending emails and it charges non-zero price.  However, 
the resulting equilibrium profits are the same as in the case where emails are costless.  Therefore, our analysis below 
is not affected.   
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The proof for Lemma 1 can be found in the appendix. Lemma 1 provides firms' 
equilibrium posted prices and profits under different regions of parameter values. An example of 
the equilibrium regions is shown in Figure 1 for r = 1.8 and L = 0.25.   
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
14 Review of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 1 [2002], No. 3, Working Paper #1
http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol1/iss3/paper1The equilibrium is in pure strategy for Region I, IV and V but is in mixed strategy for 
Region II and III. Detailed results relating to the price distributions in mixed strategy equilibrium 
can be found in the appendix. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, when few consumers search for price information (β  is small), 
the equilibrium will be in Region I.  In this region, firms have no incentive to undercut each 
other’s price because the size of competitor’s weak loyal consumers who may switch (wjβ (1-θ )) is 
small and the potential loss of revenue from a firm’s own strong loyal consumers (si) and weak 
loyal consumers who do not search (wi(1-β )) is large.  Moreover, firms have an incentive to sell to 
the wi(1-β ) segment because r < 2 by assumption and the size of this segment, which is 1-β , is 
large. Therefore, both firms set pi = 1 in equilibrium. The total profit for Firm i is a decreasing 
function of βθ  while 2βθ  is the total size of consumers targeted by emails.  This is because the 
email targeting market is more competitive than the posted prices market.  As the result, the flow 
of consumers from the posted price market to the email targeting market reduces firms’ profits. 
When a large number of consumers search for prices but few of them are targeted by 
emails (β  is large but θ  is small), the equilibrium will be in Region II. In this region, the wjβ (1-θ ) 
segment is large enough so that firms have incentive to undercut each other’s price and the 
equilibrium result is similar to that in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990) where firms adopt mixed 
strategy in pricing. Firms’ expected equilibrium prices and total profits decrease as β  increases. 
This is because as more consumers search for prices, firms compete more aggressively in the 
posted prices market and more consumers will be targeted by emailed discounts as well. We can 
also verify from Lemma 1 that, as consumer acceptance of email targeting (θ ) increases, a firm’s 
expected equilibrium price (Ei(p)) increases but its total profit, (π i) decreases.  On one hand, an 
increase in θ  results in more consumers in the highly competitive email targeting market, which 
reduces a firm’s profit.  On the other hand, an increase in θ  leaves smaller wjβ (1-θ ) segments for 
firms to compete for, which leads to higher Ei(p).  
When a large number of consumers search for price information (β  is large) and θ  
increases relative to its values in Region II, the equilibrium will be in Region III if the 
reservation price of strong loyal consumers (r) is large enough.  Similar to Region II, firms also 
adopt mixed strategies in this region. Each firm’s profit from its posted price is r, which is its 
guaranteed profit from the strong loyal segment.  Firms’ total profit increases when β  and/or θ  
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actually increase as β  increases when θ  is large enough. Firms have little incentive to compete in 
this case because a large θ  implies a small switching segment wjβ (1-θ ) and a large r implies a big 
loss of revenue from the strong loyal segment if a firm undercut its competitor to lure the 
potential switchers.  Therefore, instead of lowering their prices as more consumers search prices, 
firms in this situation become more likely to charge r to secure its profit from the strong loyal 
segment and shun away from the more price sensitive “price searchers”.
8  The change of Ei(p) 
with respect to θ  is similar to that in Region II and the same intuition applies.   It is interesting to 
notice that in this region the profit and price implications of increasing consumer search (β ) can 
actually be opposite to the conventional wisdom that lower search costs implies lower prices and 
profits (as discussed in detail in the introduction).  We discuss this somewhat surprising result in 
greater detail later in this section. 
As shown in Figure 1, if the number of consumers searching for price information is large 
(β  is large) and their acceptance of email targeting (θ ) further increases from its values in Region 
III, the equilibrium will be in Region IV. In this region, the wjβ (1-θ ) segment is still sufficiently 
large so that one firm (Firm i) has incentive to undercut the price of the other firm (Firm j) to 
obtain those switchers.  However, given Firm i’s price at 1-L, the wiβ (1-θ ) segment is not large 
enough for Firm j to lower its price to compete for.  Instead, it is optimal for Firm j to sell only to 
its strong loyal customers in this situation. Firm j's profit increases with βθ  as its revenue from 
email targeting increases and its profit from the posted price market is constant.  Firm i's profit 
decreases with θ  because a larger θ  shifts more consumers to the more competitive email 
targeting market.  When θ  is small, Firm i's profit increases with β  because larger β  at small θ  
implies that Firm i can capture more consumers from its competitor with its posted price.   
However, when θ  is large, Firm i's profit decreases with β  because an increase in β  under large θ  
moves more consumers from the posted price market to the lower priced email targeting market. 
Finally, if the number of consumers searching for price information is large and their 
acceptance of email targeting (θ ) is also high (both β  and θ  are large), the equilibrium will be in 
Region V. In this region, Both the wjβ (1-θ ) and the wi(1-β ) segments are so small that neither firm 
                                                 
8 Technically speaking, in this case the probability mass at pi=r increases in the mixed strategy equilibrium as β  
increases. 
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firm sells only to its strongly loyal customers. Both firms’ profits increase with βθ  as their 
revenue from email targeting increases and their revenue associated with the posted prices is 
constant.  
It is easy to verify that, across all regions, firms' equilibrium posted prices and total 
profits are non-decreasing as r increases and/or L increases. The intuition behind it is very 
obvious because an increase in r increases the overall willingness to pay of consumers in the 
market and an increase in L reduces competition between firms.   
Our main interest of the paper is to understand the joint impact of consumer search 
behavior and firms' targeting activities on market competition. Based on Lemma 1 and the 
discussion following it, we summarize the impact of consumer price search on firms' posted 
prices and total profits in the following proposition.  
Proposition 1 (Impact of Consumer Price Search): If consumer acceptance to email 
targeting (θ ) is small, firms' equilibrium posted prices are non-increasing and their equilibrium 
profits decrease as more consumers search for prices from competing firms (i.e. as β  increases).   
However, if consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ ) is sufficiently large, both firms' 
equilibrium posted prices and their equilibrium profits can increase as more consumers search 
for prices from competing firms.  
Proposition 1 can be proved using the results of Lemma 1.  If consumer acceptance to 
email targeting (θ ) is small, the equilibrium is in Region I when the size of the search segment 
(β ) is small or is in Region II when β  is large.  From our early discussion, firms’ posted prices 









i so that both equilibrium posted prices and profits decrease when 
the equilibrium shifts from Region I to Region II.  Therefore, we can obtain the first part of 
Proposition 1. If θ  is sufficiently large, as illustrated in Figure 1, the equilibrium will lie in 
Region III, IV or V when β  is large. Based on our early discussion, firms' equilibrium posted 
prices and profits can both increase with β  in those regions.  This leads to the second part of 
Proposition 1.  
Intuitively speaking, Proposition 1 is the result of two opposing effects of consumer price 
search activities on market competition.  Obviously, there is a competition effect: an increase in 
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across competing firms, firms are more likely to undercut each other’s posted prices. In addition, 
more consumers will be targeted by emails with even lower prices. This effect of consumer price 
search has a negative impact on firms’ prices and profits, which is consistent with conventional 
wisdom. 
However, there is also a price discrimination effect.  An increase in consumer price 
search activities provides firms better information about those “price searchers” and gives firms 
the opportunity to price them differently from the other consumers.  As a result, an increase in 
consumer price search enables firms to better price discriminate between their strong loyal 
consumers and weak loyal consumers. Consequently, it can lead to higher posted prices and 
profits. This effect becomes stronger as the consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ ) increases. 
When θ  is sufficiently large, the price discrimination effect will dominate the competition effect.  
Hence, firm’s posted prices and total profits can both increase.  
The first part of Proposition 1 confirms the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of 
consumer price search on firms’ prices and profits.  However, the second part of Proposition 1 
contradicts conventional wisdom and shows that, in the presence of email targeting, an increase 





) in a 
market can indeed increase firms’ prices and profits.  This result suggests that lowered consumer 
price search cost online (e.g. through using shopbots) may lead to either lower or higher 
observed online prices depending on the effectiveness of firms’ email targeting (which is 
captured by θ ). Thus, this proposition offers reconciliation to the seemingly divergent empirical 
findings regarding online retail prices as we mentioned in Introduction.  
The Internet in general and shopbots in particular have drastically reduced consumer 
search costs for prices.  Therefore, it will be interesting to compare firms’ prices and profits 
under extreme values of β , which correspond to big differences in consumer search costs.  We 
have the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: If both consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ ) and consumer 
heterogeneity in willingness to pay (r) are sufficiently large, firms’ posted prices and profits are 
higher in the case where a sufficiently large proportion of consumers search for prices (β→ 1) 
than in the case where no consumer searches for prices (β  = 0). 
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i  as r→ 2.  The 
same results can be obtained by comparing posted prices and profits in Region III or IV to 
Region I.  Actually, as demonstrated in Figure 1, θ  need not be very high for the equilibrium to 
be in Region III, IV or V.  Therefore, Corollary 1 holds for a large range of parameter values of 
θ .  Corollary 1 extends the conclusion in Proposition 1 by indicating that with the presence of 
email targeting, firms’ prices and profits can increase not only with a marginal decrease but also 
with a dramatic decrease in consumer price search cost. 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 reveal the impact of consumer price search on equilibrium 
outcomes with different levels of email targeting activities.  We now look at the impact of θ , i.e. 
consumer acceptance of email targeting (or in other words, the effectiveness of targeting emails), 
on firms' posted prices and total profits.  The results are given in Proposition 2 below.   
Proposition 2 (Impact of Targeting Emails):  If the proportion of consumers searching 
prices (β ) is small, firms' equilibrium posted prices are non-decreasing and their equilibrium 
profits decrease as more consumers are targeted by emails (i.e. as θ  increases).  However, if the 
proportion of consumers searching prices (β ) is sufficiently large, both firms' equilibrium posted 
prices and their equilibrium profits can increase as more consumers are targeted by emails. 
Similar to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 can be proved using the results of Lemma 1. If β  
is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is either in Region I for all θ  or in Region I then Region II 
as θ  increases.  In both cases, we have firms' posted prices non-decreasing and profits decreasing 
with respect to θ .  If β  is sufficiently large, the equilibrium will fall in Region III, IV or V when 
θ  is large. From the discussion following Lemma 1, firms' equilibrium posted prices can increase 
in those regions as θ  increases and their values can be higher than those in the cases where θ  is 
small (i.e. in Region I or II). Also from Lemma 1, firms’ equilibrium profits in those regions 
increase with θ  as well. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that for Proposition 1. First, there is a 
competition effect. An increase in targeting activities (θ ) intensifies competition between firms 
because the email targeting market is more competitive than the posted prices market. 
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also a price discrimination effect.  An increase in targeting coverage further separates “price 
searchers” from strong loyal consumers and thus enables firms to better price discriminate 
between them.  This price discrimination effect has a positive impact on firms' posted prices and 
profits.  When consumer search activities are limited (β  is small), the competition effect 
dominates the price discrimination effect since the email targeting market is very competitive 
compared to the posted prices market. This is because though the size of targeted consumers may 
be large due to high opt-in, the ability to price discriminate is small due to the small β .
9 
Moreover, since most consumers do not search, the market for posted prices is not very 
competitive.  However, when β  is large, the price discrimination effect dominates the 
competition effect.  Now the targeting market is not very competitive compared to the posted 
price market because a larger β  leads to more competition even in the market of posted prices.  
Furthermore, the size of targeted consumers becomes large so that the benefit from price 
discrimination increases.  
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate the importance of investigating the impact of consumer 
price search and firm targeting behavior using an integrated approach.  The interaction between 
consumer price search and firms' email targeting is captured by βθ  in our model.  When this 
interaction is small (i.e. either β  or θ  is small), the results in the two propositions converge to 
similar conclusions as in the previous literature (Bakos 1997, Thisse and Vives 1988, Shaffer and 
Zhang 1995).  However, when this interaction is strong (i.e. both β  and θ  are large), the opposite 
is true.  In the context of the Internet, the interaction between consumer price search and firms' 
email targeting tends to be strong.  On one hand, consumers empowered by Internet technologies 
such as shopbots can compare prices across several stores at one shot using a few "clicks". 
Consequently, their product preferences and price sensitivities are revealed to firms through their 
search activities and the resultant purchase decisions. On the other hand, firms equipped with 
emails servers and electronic databases can gather a large amount of consumer information 
online in real time and target consumers individually with negligible cost.  This enables firms to 
price discriminate and helps mitigate (and even overcome) the competitive pressures on firm 
prices and profits. Therefore as suggested by Propositions 1 and 2, the implications of the 
                                                 
9  When β  is small, most people do not search so that their types cannot be identified. 
20 Review of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 1 [2002], No. 3, Working Paper #1
http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol1/iss3/paper1reduced consumer price search cost on market competition can be very different from the 
predictions made by current theory that do not consider the interactions between shopbots and 
email targeting in the context of the Internet. As we explain in the introduction, our predictions 
are also consistent with the empirical findings of Clay et al. (2001), who have found that recently 
prices in the online book market have tended to rise. 
Before concluding our analysis of the basic model in this section, we briefly discuss the 
welfare implications of consumer price search activities and firms' ability to target online.  An 
interesting result is given in Corollary 2 below.   
Corollary 2 If a large number of consumers search prices and accept targeting emails 
(i.e. both β  and θ  are large), some consumers who do not receive targeted emails will not buy 
from either firm. Nevertheless, in this condition (i.e. when both β  and θ  are large), an increase in 
the number of consumers who search prices and/or accept targeting emails (i.e. as β  and/or θ  
increase) can increase both total consumer welfare and firms’ profits. 
Corollary 2 is directly obtained from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 and 2. If the 
equilibrium is in Region I or II, all consumers are served in the market.  Thus, consumer welfare 
increases (decreases) as firms’ profits decreases (increases) in those regions. However, if the 
equilibrium is in Region III, IV or V (where both β  and θ  are large enough), some weak loyal 
consumers who do not receive targeting emails may not buy from either firm because at least one 
firm sets its posted prices at r with nonzero probabilities.  Consequently, there are losses in total 
social welfare. As β  and/or θ  increase in those regions, more consumers will be served through 
the email targeting market and thus total social welfare increases. Consequently, it is possible for 
both firms and consumers to be better off when β  and/or θ  increase.   For example, firms’ profits 
increase with respect to β  and θ  in Region V.  The total consumer welfare in this region is 
W=2(r+βθ -π
V
i)= 2βθ (1-L). It increases with respect to β  and θ  as well.  
Corollary 2 implies that consumers who do not search or do not like to receive targeting 
emails can be left out of the market by high prices, and this results in a loss of social welfare. 
However, given existing high levels of consumer search activities and firms’ targeting efforts, 
any further increase in consumer price search and targeting emails may actually improve total 
consumer welfare and benefit firms simultaneously. It is interesting for the Internet policy 
makers that consumers who are dissatisfied with online privacy and therefore refuse to opt-in can 
21 Chen and Sudhir: When Shopbots Meet Emails
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011be left out of the market when much of the market place is satisfied with the privacy standards 
and therefore opts in. 
4. Extensions 
In this section, we extend our basic model in several respects to obtain additional insights 
on the joint impact of consumer price search and firms targeting on market competition.  First, in 
§4.1, we endogenize the level of consumer search and opt-in by explicitly modeling consumers’ 
price search and opt-in behavior as determined by their costs of search and opt-in and the 
expected gains from doing so.  In §4.2, we relax the symmetry assumption of firms and discuss 
the competitive implications of consumer price search and firms’ email targeting in the context 
of asymmetric firms. Finally, in §4.3, we investigate the robustness of our main conclusions by 
relaxing the technical assumptions we make in the basic model. 
4.1.  Endogenous Price Search and Opt-In Decisions 
In the basic model, we treat the number of consumers who search prices from competing 
firms (β ) and consumers' opt-in decisions (θ ) as exogenous.  In this section, we extend the basic 
model to allow consumers' price search decisions as well as their decisions to opt into firms' 
email lists to be endogenous. These decisions are determined by trading off the costs and the 
expected gain from search and opt-in.   
Assume that search costs are uniformly distributed on [0,Cs] and opt-in costs are 
uniformly distributed on [0,Ct] for consumers in the weak loyal segments. Let  γ  be the size of 
the price search segment among each firm’s weak loyal consumers who are not targeted by 
emails and φ  be the size of each firm’s weak loyal consumers who are targeted by emails (i.e. opt 
in).  γ  corresponds to β (1- θ ) and φ  corresponds to βθ  in our basic model. Let gs and gt be the 
expected gains from price search and opt-in excluding the costs of doing so, respectively. We 
have that gs =gs(γ ,φ ) and gt=gt(γ ,φ ). Obviously, γ  is a function of Cs and gs(γ ,φ ) and φ  is a 





















 in equilibrium. This leads to the following proposition.  
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who opt-in are non-decreasing as consumers’ search costs decrease.  As the costs of opt-in 
decrease, the number of consumers that accept firms' targeting emails is non-decreasing but the 
number of consumers that price search is non-increasing. 
The first part of proposition 3 further confirms the key intuition of the paper: consumer 
price search behavior and firms' targeting activities are highly correlated.  Proposition 3 indicates 
that as the Internet reduces consumer search costs, not only more consumers will engage in price 
search but more consumers will also opt-in and can be targeted by competing firms.   
Consequently, when consumer search cost drastically reduces online, firms' profits and prices 
can actually increase as shown in the basic model.  
The second part of proposition 3 shows that if the cost of opt-in reduces (e.g. consumers 
become less concerned about privacy violations), more consumers tend to accept targeting 
emails.  As a result, firms have fewer consumers to compete for in the posted prices market. This 
reduces firms' incentive to compete in the market of post prices and thus the expected gain for 
the consumers who search but do not opt-in also decreases.  Therefore, the volume of price 
searchers tends to decline as the opt-in cost reduces.   This result appears to be consistent with 
lower than expected price search activities observed online as reported by Johnson et al. (2001).  
They found limited consumer search activities for books, CDs and travel sites. Internet firms in 
those product categories, such as Amazon, CDNow and Expedia, are well known for their 
extensive use of targeted emails. 
4.2.  Asymmetric Firms 
So far, our discussion was limited to competition between symmetric firms.  However, 
the main conclusions we derive from the basic model also apply to the case where the competing 
firms are asymmetric. To demonstrate this, we focus on the equilibrium corresponding to Region 
I and V in Lemma 1.  Assume that the size of Firm 1’s strong loyal segment is λ s>1, the size of 
its weak loyal segment is λ w>1, the reservation price of its strong loyal segment is r1>r with 
λ sr1<λ s+λ w, and the minimum price difference needed for its weak loyal consumers to switch is 
L1>L.  Let Firm 2 be the same as in the basic model.   For the email targeting market, Firm 1 
charges L1 and Firm 2 charges 0 to Firm 1’s weak loyal consumers in equilibrium. The resulting 
profits are λ wβθ L1 for Firm 1 and 0 for Firm 2. Similarly, Firm 2 obtains a profit of βθ L and 
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basic case.  Firms’ total equilibrium profits in this case are π
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βθ (1-L).  Both profits decrease with respect to β  and θ , which are similar to our results from the 
basic model.   
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corresponds to Region V in the basic model.  Firms’ total equilibrium profits in this case are 
π
V
1=r1λ s +λ wβθ L1 and π
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2=r+βθ L.  Both profits increase with respect to β  and θ  and p
V
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than p
I
i.  These results are similar to those in Proposition 1 and 2.   Also, it is obvious that π
V
i can 
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I
i when r1 or r is sufficiently large, leading to the same conclusion as Corollary 1.  
Comparing changes of firms’ profits at β  = θ  = 1 to β  = 0, we have that  
∆ =(π
V




2|β =θ =1 - π
I
2|β =0) = (r1-1)λ s-(r-1)-λ w(1-L1)+(1-L)   (6) 
It is easy to see that ∆  increases with r1, λ s and L1 but decreases with λ w. The reason 
behind this result is as follows. Firm 1’s gain from the price discrimination effect increases when 
r1 or λ s increases and its profit from email targeting increases with respect to L1 as a larger L1 
leads to less competition. However, an increase in λ w puts more consumers into the more 
competitive email targeting market and therefore reduces the firm’s profit.  Thus, the firm with a 
stronger market position (larger L) and a larger number of strong loyal consumers with higher 
willingness to pay will benefit more as consumer search cost drastically reduces and firms’ 
targeting ability increases in the online world.  However, a firm with only more weak loyal 
consumers will benefit less than its competitor or could be even worse off in this new 
competitive environment. 
This result indicates that the value of loyalty is great in the online world and offers some 
support for online firms trying very hard to build a large customer base in the hopes of future 
competitive advantage. Our result however is particularly insightful as a warning that it is can be 
a disadvantage to have a large customer base if the customer base lacks strong loyalty. A larger 
customer base can be a competitive advantage only if it comes with a superior product or service 
that inspires high loyalty. 
4.3. Relaxation of Technical Assumptions 
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basic model. An important assumption in the basic model is that a firm's strong loyal consumers 
and weak loyal consumers who do not search (i.e. consumers in si, and wi(1-β )) have no incentive 
to opt-in for targeting emails.  This assumption rules out firms’ incentive to target those 
consumers. As we discussed in §2, this assumption holds as long as the cost of checking an email 
is nonzero.    If this assumption does not hold (i.e. the cost of checking an email is zero), firms 
can target consumers in wi(1-β ) with price at 1 in Region V and, unlike in the basic model, their 
profits will decrease with β  in this region. However, even under this case, our results regarding 
Region III is unchanged because it is optimal for wi(1-β ) consumers not to opt into firms’ email 
lists in this equilibrium
10.  Thus, we can still find situations where firms’ profits and prices 
increase with β  and θ  after relaxing this assumption.  
In the basic model we assume that the cost of visiting a website of the firm a customer is 
loyal to is zero.  If such cost is small but nonzero, the weak loyal consumers will not buy from 
the firm they are loyal to, if they expect the firm’s price to be at 1 and the strong loyal consumers 
will not buy if they expect the firm’s price to be at r.  Consequently, the current equilibrium 
results no longer hold to Region I, IV and V.  However, we can easily overcome this problem by 
slightly modifying our model as follows:  Assume there are groups of consumers of size α s and 
α w in the strong loyal segments and weak loyal segments respectively.  Consumers in α s and α w 
will buy from the firm offering lower prices (i.e. L=0 for them) and they always search. 
Obviously, firms will charge the opt-in consumers from α s and α w zero prices in the email 
targeting market. For the same reason as in the basic model, consumers who do not search have 
no incentive to receive targeting emails as long as the cost of checking an email is nonzero.  This 
modified model allows consumers to incur a small cost to visit a website they are loyal to 
because neither firm will set price at 1 or r with probability 1 in equilibrium. Except that, the 
equilibrium results in this extended model are virtually the same as in the basic model for small 
                                                 
10 If a consumer in wi(1-β ) switches from “opt-out” to “opt-in”,  firms’ posted prices will increase because Firm i is 
more likely to charge the posted price of pi=r. This is because there are fewer weak loyal consumers in the posted 
price market. This implies that the consumer’s surplus will be reduced if she buys in the posted price market after 
opting in. However she cannot gain in surplus by buying at the targeted prices, because Firm i will never charge her 
a targeting price below 1.  
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with α s → 0 and α w→ 0. All insights from the basic model remain the same.  We adopt the 
simplified assumption in our basic model only to facilitate exposition.  
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, similar to Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990), explicit solutions for mixed strategy 
equilibrium corresponding to Region II and III are difficult to obtain. However, the results for 
other regions are the same even for this case.  Therefore, the essential conclusions from the basic 
model remain robust. 
5. Conclusion 
The Internet has facilitated a number of tools such as shopbots and targeted emails. 
Relative to the traditional offline retailing, these tools reduce the costs of information transfer 
between firms and consumers by several orders of magnitude. Shopbots facilitate consumer price 
comparison across a number of online firms at fairly low search costs. Emails reduce the firms’ 
cost of targeted communication with consumers. Since these tools have a major impact on how 
consumers receive competitive price information when making a purchase, they have important 
implications for price competition. In this paper, we investigate the implications of these tools 
for online price competition by modeling the interactive effects between them for the first time. 
A key insight that we obtained from our analysis is that an increase in price comparison 
due to lower search costs provides firms the opportunity to learn about individual consumer 
preferences and price sensitivity. The Internet facilitates such learning and allows targeted 
marketing to consumers through emails.  In contrast to the conventional wisdom that lower 
search costs on the Internet intensifies price competition and reduces profitability, we 
demonstrate that the competition intensification effect may be overwhelmed by the price 
discrimination effect achieved from superior targeting ability on the Internet. This can raise 
average prices and profitability of firms despite the reduction in search costs. 
Our analysis offers interesting strategic insights for managers about how to address the 
competitive problems associated with low search costs on the Internet:  
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pricing so as to prevent the Internet from becoming a competitive minefield that destroys 
firm profitability. In fact we show that low search costs can facilitate better price 
personalization and can thus aid in improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing efforts. 
(2)  The analysis also offers guidelines on online customer acquisition efforts. The critical issue 
for competitive advantage is not in increasing market share per se, but in increasing the 
loyalty of the customers. While a larger share of very loyal customers reduces competitive 
intensity, surprisingly a larger share of customers who are not very loyal can be a 
competitive disadvantage. In order for customer acquisition to be profitable, it should be 
accompanied by a superior product or service that can ensure high loyalty. 
(3)  Investing in online privacy initiatives that assures consumers that their private information 
will not be abused other than to offer them “deals” is worthwhile. Such assurances will 
encourage consumers to opt into firm mailing lists. This facilitates successful targeting 
which in turn ameliorates the competitive threats posed by low search costs on the Internet.  
(4)  When the overwhelming majority of customers are satisfied with online privacy, the 
remaining privacy conscious customers who are not willing to pay a higher price to 
maintain their privacy will be left out of the market. While this may be of some concern to 
privacy advocates, it is interesting that total consumer welfare can be higher even if some 
consumers are left out. 
Our primary analysis captures the competitive implications of the interaction between two 
institutions facilitated by the Internet: Shopbots and Emails. But our research question is more 
fundamental:  What is the nature of competition in an environment with low costs for both 
consumer search and firm-to-consumer personalized communications? Our strategic insights 
may therefore be beneficially applied to offline businesses that can replicate such an 
environment. For example, offline retailers could have websites on which they post prices 
allowing for easy price comparisons. They can use tools such as frequency programs to create 
addressable databases that enable them to communicate with customers by direct mail or email 
(as many airlines and stores do). 
This research however is only a first step towards understanding the competitive 
implications of the Internet. By design, we have focused on communication of only price 
information to control for other effects. Previous research however has indicated that the 
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differentiation among products and thus reduce competitive intensity (Zettelmeyer 1998). 
Moreover, Lal and Sarvary (1999) distinguish between products with primarily digital and non-
digital attributes and show that competition may be reduced on the Internet for products with 
non-digital attributes. Future research therefore needs to evaluate the robustness of our insights 
by incorporating finer aspects of consumer search. 
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 Appendix 
 
A.1.  Proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 and 2    









 (Region I), then pi=1 in equilibrium with π io=2-βθ .  This is because neither 
firm would like to set pi=r as r<2-βθ . Also, neither firm has incentive to undercut its competitor’s price to get its 



















, then each firm has incentive to undercut the other’s price in order to get 
the wβ (1-θ ) segment from its competitor.  This is because [2-βθ +β (1-θ )](1-L)>2-βθ  now holds. This scenario is 
similar to the model discussed in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990).  The equilibrium involves mixed strategy because 
Firm i has incentive to undercut Firm j’s price by L if pj is high enough but has incentive to increase its price if pj is 
low enough.  The mixed equilibrium is derived below. The logic of the proof follows Raju, Srinivasan and Lal 
(1990).  
First, let pn1 be the lowest price of Firm j that Firm i is willing to undercut. pn1>1-L must hold because (1-
2L)[2-βθ +β (1-θ )]<2-βθ  always holds as 
1
6
L >  by assumption. This implies that rather than undercut pj=1-L by 
setting pi below 1-2L, Firm i is better off by setting pi=1 to secure its own wβ (1-θ ) segment and obtain π io=2-βθ .  










Next, let pn2 be the lowest price Firm i will charge if such price does not undercut Firm j’s price by L.  


















. This is corresponding to 
Region II in Lemma 1.  In this case, Firm i’s price support is pi∈ [pn,1]∪  (pn-L,1-L) because 1) neither firm would 
undercut price lower than pn by L and 2) for any pj≤ 1-L, Firm i would like to secure its own wβ (1-θ ) segment by 
setting pi=pj+L rather than undercut pj by setting pi below pj-L.  No probability mass can exist at 1-L because Firm i 
can undercut pj=1 to obtain the wjβ (1-θ ) segment only at pi below 1-L.  Also, probability mass cannot exist at pn-L 
because Firm i will set pi=1 rather than pn-L if pj=pn. Denoting Hi(p)=Pr(pi≥ p), we have the following equations 
from the profit-invariant nature of mixed strategy equilibrium. 
 
π io=pi[(2-β )+β (1-θ )Hj(pi-L)], if pn≤ pi≤ 1       ( A 1 )  
π io=pi{(2-β )+2β (1-θ )Hj(pi+L)+β (1-θ )[1-Hj(pi+L)]}, if pn-L<pi<1-L   (A2) 
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, if pn-L<pi<1-L .                                             (A5) 
 
The probability mass at 1 is given by q1=Hi(1) and the probability mass at pn is given by qn=Hi(1-L)- Hi(pn). The 
expected equilibrium price of each firm can then be derived from its definition:  
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=− + − ++
∂∂ ∫∫ . 
The result is as provided in Lemma 1.  










, we have the Region III in Lemma 1.  In this case, 
Firm i’s price support is pi∈ {r}∪  (pn,1]∪  (pn-L,1-L]. Comparing to Region II, r is on the price support but there is 
no probability mass at pn.  This is because instead of setting pi=pn Firm i will be better off setting pi=r in this case. 
There can be a probability mass at 1-L because Firm i can now charge pi=1-L in order to get the wjβ (1-θ ) segment not 
served by Firm j when pj=r.    (A1)-(A5) still hold in this region by replacing (A3) with π io=pi if pi=r. Therefore, 
π io=r in equilibrium and the probability mass at 1-L is given by q1-L=Hi(1-L)- Hi(pn).  In addition, we have that  
 














.  Since Hi(r)= Hi(1) obtained from (A4), there is no 
probability mass at pi=1, i.e. the equilibrium price support is actually pi∈ {r}∪  (pn,1)∪  (pn-L,1-L] in this case.  
Similar to Region II, the expected equilibrium price of each firm can then be derived from its definition:  
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=− + − +− +
∂∂ ∫∫ ,  
which leads to the result reported in Lemma 1. 
If r≥ 2-βθ , Firm i will never charge a price below r if it cannot undercut the other firm’s price by L to get 







, i.e. in Region IV, Firm i has incentive to set price at 1-L to get Firm j’s 
wβ (1-θ ) segment when pj=r because (1-L)[2-βθ +β (1-θ )]>r.   However, Firm j has no incentive to further undercut 
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1
6
L > .  Therefore, we have pi=1-L, pj=r, 
π io=[2+β (1-2θ )](1-L) and π jo=r in the equilibrium.  







.  In this case neither firm has incentive to 
undercut the other firm for the wjβ (1-θ ) segment by setting pi below r because (1-L)[2-βθ +β (1-θ )]≤ r. Therefore, pi=r 
and π io=r in the equilibrium.   
Since the above regions are mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible values of parameters in the model, 
we have equilibrium results derived for the entire parameter space.   The comparative statics of equilibrium profit 
w.r.t. the parameters in the model are easy to obtain by examining the signs of first order derivatives. So do the 
comparative statics of equilibrium price w.r.t. the parameters in the model for Region I, IV, and V. For Region II 
and III, the comparative statics of expected equilibrium price w.r.t. the parameters in the model are obtained by 
numerical examination because the expression of Ei(p) given in Lemma 1 is very complicated.   Since all parameters 
are confined to a closed range (1<r<2, 
11
63
L << , 0≤β≤ 1, and 0≤θ≤ 1), the numerical analysis provides thorough 
results. The results regarding all such comparative statics are discussed following Lemma 1 and summarized in 
Proposition 1 and 2.  
 
A.2. Proof for Proposition 3    
Because of the symmetric nature of the two firms, we only focus on the symmetric case where γ =γ 1=γ 2 and 
φ =φ 1=φ 2 in equilibrium. For any given γ  and φ , the equilibrium results of Lemma 1 still hold by letting β (1- θ )=γ  and 
βθ =φ . Let Sn be the surplus of a consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who does not search, Sγ  be the surplus of a 
consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who searches but does not opt in targeting emails, and Sφ  be the surplus of 
a consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who opts in firms' targeting emails. Then by definition gs = Sγ - Sn and gt 
= Sφ  -Sγ . It is obvious that gs=0 if equilibrium happens at Region I, IV or V. Since gs=0 implies γ =0 which leads to 
β =0 or θ =1, from Lemma 1, Region I and V can be in equilibrium but Region IV cannot. This is consistent with the 
claim that φ =φ 1=φ 2 in equilibrium because Region IV is the only region where firms' strategies can be asymmetric.   
For equilibrium at Region II, we have that Sn=1-E(p),  Sφ =1-L. To calculate Sγ , notice that a consumer in γ i 
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because if pi=r consumers in γ  will not buy.   Similar to Region II, we have 
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Since both Sγ  and Sn are functions of γ  and φ , gs and gt are also functions of γ  and φ . Therefore, we have that 
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. The proof is as follows. By 
definition,
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at γ =γ 0, more consumers would engage in price search (i.e. γ  
would be larger than γ 0) because the expected gain from search increases as γ  increases. This contradicts that γ 0 is in 





































 in equilibrium because 
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must hold in equilibrium (this 













. The proof is as follows. From




















.   Using the expressions of Sγ  and Sn derived early, we can numerically verify that 
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, notice that for an  γ ∆  increase 
in γ , the corresponding increase in φ  is 
min( ( , ), ) min( ( , ), )
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∆= ∆ + ∫∫ .  The first term 
in the right side of the expression is an increase in φ  due to more consumers engaging in price search. The second 


















for the entire parameter space. Because we 







































































 must also hold according to (A9). 
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